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Proactive Rhetoric
DAVID STOESZ, PH.D.
Virginia Commonwealth University
Richmond, Virginia 23284
The American welfare state is coming apart. In The Rhetoric of Reaction,
Albert 0. Hirschman explained how conservatives had used three themes
to counter liberal expansion of social and economic rights: perversity,
futility, and jeopardy. This essay expands Hirschman's formulation retro-
spectively by identifying the liberal antecedents---adequacy, equality, and
regulation-that prompted the recent conservative assault on the American
welfare state. Further, the author presents three themes to thwart the con-
servative critique of welfare-mobility, empowerment, and restructuring.
As illustrative of "proactive rhetoric", these themes are proposed to guide
future social policy in the United States.
The American welfare state is slowly coming apart. Conser-
vative influences in social policy during the past decade have
effectively banished the liberal dream of replicating the northern
European welfare state in the United States. In place of incremen-
tal progress in protecting citizens against insecurities associated
with industrialization and capitalism, Americans have witnessed
a bipartisan effort to alter fundamentally, if not retract outright the
legislation that has served as the foundation for the nation's social
policy for more than a half-century. Instead of adding benchmarks
to the expansion of the welfare state, liberals have been reduced
to defending the very social programs that have been the bedrock
of contemporary social progress. The evidence is irrefutable. In
1989, Congress repealed Catastrophic Health Insurance, the first
retraction of a social insurance program in the history of the
American welfare state. During the first term of the Clinton pres-
idency, the Health Security Act was soundly defeated. In 1996,
President Clinton signed the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act, capping the expenditures for Aid
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to Families with Dependent Children, devolving the program
to the states, and setting time-limits on receipt of aid, the most
radical change in welfare policy since the War on Poverty. Striking
at the heart of the welfare state, a bipartisan panel presented three
options for salvaging Social Security, each of which called for
partial privatization of the program.
That this has come to pass is more a testament to the chore-
ography of public sentiment than it is an inherent cynicism of
Americans toward the needy. Indeed, as far back as the late 1970s,
the President of the American Enterprise Institute had pledged
to alter public philosophy so that is was more congruent with
conservative precepts. During the 1980s, policy institutes from
the ideological right-the Heritage Foundation, the Manhattan
Institute, and the Hoover Institution-planned and executed a
series of maneuvers that succeeded in reversing liberal hegemony
in social policy. By the end of the decade, liberals were faced with
a paradox: although Americans tended to support social welfare
programs (Cook and Barrett, 1992), conservatives were defining
the debate on the future of social policy. How had conservatives
become so masterful at employing rhetoric in order to put public
opinion to ideological service? What could this indicate for future
directions in social policy?
In 1991, Albert 0. Hirschman addressed such questions in The
Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy. Having served
on the Ford Foundation's project on the future of the American
welfare state, Hirschman was provoked to consider the quite pro-
found impact of the relatively flimsy critiques of American social
welfare programs which had been advanced by conservatives. In
this prescient-if self-congratulatory-book, Hirschman drew on
T. H. Marshall's three stages of citizenship-civil, political, and
social and economic-to assess the inordinate difficulty encoun-
tered by liberals in advancing the American welfare state into
the third stage. Using historical material, Hirschman proposed
that earlier progress in citizenship-attaining and defending civil
and political rights-had also encountered adversity. Moreover,
Hirschman concluded that conservative arguments against pro-
gressive change could be organized around three theses: perver-
sity, futility, jeopardy. What made Hirschman's work precocious
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was his observation that these very theses characterize much of
the current, conservative assault on the American welfare state.
By now the critique of the welfare state trumpeted from the
political Right has a familiar ring: Rather than alleviating depri-
vation, welfare programs worsen dependency and contribute to
a malignant underclass (it is perverse). Rather than ameliorate
conditions of the poor, poverty persists despite the hundreds of
billions of dollars spent on social welfare (it is futile). Rather than
advance social and economic rights of the disadvantaged, social
programs require the elaboration of the state, the expansion of
which attenuates freedom and prosperity for all (it is jeopardy).
Such arguments are not novel, contends Hirschman; they surface
regularly when conservatives wish to sabotage progress.
Although he was able to identify some of sources of regressive
rhetoric, such as Charles Murray (1984), Hirschman's work is
incomplete. In part, this is a result of his omitting other con-
servative seers, such as Peter Berger and Marvin Olasky, and
the intellectual organizations that have promoted conservative
philosophy during the past two decades, such as the American
Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation. In part, it is
because the book appeared before Bill Clinton's election to the
presidency, the failure of the administration's Health Security
Act, the 1994 Republican electoral triumph that was underscored
in subsequent Congressional elections, and the welfare reform
legislation signed into law in 1996-events that further propelled
conservatism in America. The purpose of this essay is to expand
Hirschman's outline on conservative theses advanced against the
welfare state in order to identify its liberal antecedents, as well
as propose a set of theses that could serve to direct future social
policy.
The Liberal Antecedents of Reactionary Rhetoric
In aiming at social programs, conservatives put liberalism
squarely in their sights. Two decades of sniping have clarified
the specific theses that conservatives have targeted as well as
the liberal counterattack. The success that conservatives have
enjoyed in shaping public philosophy can be attributed to their
construction and maintenance of a network of policy institutes
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that has put up an incessant assault on liberalism and social
welfare programs. To compound matters, the Left has consistently
reverted to predictable refrains in reply to the conservative cri-
tique. Conservatives have become so proficient at this rhetorical
parrying that they routinely reduce progressives to ideological
caricature. This occurs because, instead of posing an alternative
set of theses, liberals have found comfort in defending familiar,
shopworn ideas.
Thus, the liberal antecedents to conservative rhetoric have
not only provided the fuel for the Right, but they have also
become a crutch for the Left-one that offers diminishing support.
Probably the best indications of the conservative aptitude for this
rhetorical game are the differing atmospheres that pervade the
respective ideological camps. The Left, once the fount of optimism
effused by the likes of Pete Seeger and Hubert Humphrey, evinces
a pitiable dejection, while the Right, at one time the refuge of
spoilsports like Richard Nixon, produces the spirited orneriness
of P.J. O'Rourke and Newt Gingrich. During the 1960s, liberals
smirked that there weren't any Republican folksongs; but since
the 1980s conservatives seem to be having all the fun.
The liberalism that evolved with the New Deal and the Great
Society orbited around three poles: adequacy, equality, and regu-
lation. Adequacy was articulated by programs that assured income
to those populations marginal to the labor market. Income entitle-
ments were extended to poor workers by creation and elevation
of the minimum wage and upon retirement the provision of a
minimal pension through Social Security. For those outside the
labor market, welfare programs, such as Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC), Food Stamps, and Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) guaranteed a financial floor. In the half-
century following passage of the Social Security Act, non-income
supports were offered, such as health care (Medicare and Med-
icaid), prenatal care (the Women, Infants, and Children Supple-
mental Nutrition Program), and housing (Section 8). Behind the
adequacy thesis was a liberal assumption that providing basic
supports for the poor would free them to use opportunities, such
as education and work, to prosper.
Equality was a direct response to the social and income strati-
fication of American culture according to class, race, and gender.
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The redistributional impulse that at least formally taxed the rich at
higher rates in order to provide benefits to workers was advanced
by Progressives to ameliorate problems associated with diverg-
ing classes. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 extended social and
political rights to African Americans whose opportunities were
attenuated by de facto segregation. In order to encourage em-
ployers to hire and promote minorities and women, Affirmative
Action was introduced. In advancing equality, liberals argued
that government's assurance of equal political rights should be
extended to the economic and social sectors, as well. The ultimate
objective was a society in which class, race, and gender, if not
eradicated, would no longer circumscribe opportunity for entire
subpopulations.
Regulation served to justify governmental intrusion into the
economy in the late industrial period. During the Progressive
Era, regulation was the instrument of choice to clean up cor-
ruption and exploitation in government, the production of food
and drugs, commerce and banking, and working conditions for
women and children (Jansson, 1993). A more central role for
government in markets was sanctioned by Keynesian theory in
order to avoid recession. Governmental actions to counter the
Depression and defend the nation during the Second World War
then the Cold War led Americans to expect federal intervention
when America's prosperity and security were threatened. During
the post-war era, federal initiatives were authorized in order to
keep the nation strong in the event of foreign aggression, among
them the G.I. Bill, completion of the inter-state highway system,
and an extensive student loan program (Newman, 1993). Much
of the liberal activist agenda after 1960s-the Civil Rights Act, the
ill-fated Equal Rights Amendment, the Occupational Safety and
Health Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act-were justified
by a broad interpretation of the regulatory role of the federal
government.
Adequacy, equality, and regulation served liberalism well,
effectively orienting American social policy for a half-century. The
brew was sufficiently potent that even conservative presidents-
Eisenhower and Nixon-conceded not only the correctness of
liberally-inspired policies but also worked to extend them. By
1980 social program expenditures accounted for more than 57
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percent of the federal budget and almost 20 percent of Gross Do-
mestic Product (Stoesz, 1996). In the judgment of most observers,
the welfare state had become an institutional fixture in American
culture (Marmor, et al., 1990).
The Conservative Critique
The conservative challenge to liberal hegemony in social pol-
icy began with a string of policy institutes promoting conser-
vatism as public philosophy. Think tanks, such as the American
Enterprise Institute, the Heritage Foundation, the Hoover Institu-
tion, the Manhattan Institute, among others, collected resentment
that had accumulated within the corporate sector, the right wing
of the Republican party (as well as some disaffected conserva-
tive Democrats), and the grass-roots traditionalist movement and
catalyzed a fundamental critique of liberal social policy This
ideological offensive was played-out much in the way Hirschman
described.
Conservatives attacked the liberal adequacy thesis by argu-
ing that its consequences were perverse. Rather than assure the
poor of a safety-net from which they could bounce back into
productive activities, welfare insidiously induced dependency,
lulling economically marginal families into an underclass from
which they could not escape. Charles Murray popularized this
thesis in Losing Ground which appeared in 1984. Still, Murray
was somewhat uncertain about how to remedy the degeneracy
he attributed to welfare, so he obliquely presented his solution
as "a thought experiment": "scrapping the entire federal welfare
and income support structure for working-aged persons, includ-
ing AFDC, Medicaid, Food Stamps, Unemployment Insurance,
Worker's Compensation, subsidized housing, disability, and the
rest" (1984, pp. 227-28). However elliptically presented, the sug-
gestion of outright elimination of all welfare was breathtaking.
No less astonishing was the relatively weak evidence that Murray
offered to substantiate his argument.
This idea that welfare exacerbated poverty led conservative
analysts to differentiate a "new" behavioral poverty from the
"old" cash poverty (Mead, 1992). While the income programs of
the social safety-net might be appropriate for the prudent poor,
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the problem of behavioral poverty called for a more strategic
response. According to Lawrence Mead (1986), the negative ef-
fects of welfare could be corrected by making receipt of benefits
conditional on mainstream behavior, particularly work. Thus,
welfare-to-work featured prominently in the Family Support Act
of 1988; in order to receive AFDC, beneficiaries without exempt-
ing circumstances would be required to participate in education,
training, or job placement services or lose their benefits. Once hav-
ing found a job, recipients of AFDC were entitled to "transitional
benefits", the receipt of assistance for child care, transportation,
and Medicaid for a year to ease the transition to private sector
employment (Stoesz & Karger, 1989).
By the early 1990s enforcing reciprocity among welfare recip-
ients had become fashionable among state governors. Wisconsin
introduced "learnfare", the requirement that children on AFDC
demonstrate regular school attendance or their family would lose
benefits. New Jersey promoted family planning by refusing to in-
crease benefits for additional children born after welfare benefits
were granted. Several states took President Clinton at his word
for his intent to "end welfare as we know it" by introducing a
time-limit on receipt of welfare, the termination of benefits being
the ultimate form of conditionality. By the time the 104th Congress
was prepared to "devolve" welfare to the states in a block grant,
some 40 states had already received waivers from the federal
government to pilot experiments. State welfare experiments and
passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996-aka "welfare reform"-further vali-
dated the perversity thesis.
The Right also attacked the liberal equality thesis, contend-
ing that social programs were futile in the face of unalterable
societal forces. Foremost, conservatives alleged that poverty had
become more intractable even as public welfare expenditures
increased. The more benign expression of the futility thesis por-
trayed class, race, and gender as "deep" structures that were
simply immutable. George Gilder, for example, indicated that the
interaction of race, gender, and class were too formidable to be
transformed by social programs. Accordingly, his solution was to
leave the poor to benefit from "the spur of their own poverty"
(1981, p. 118). Brigitte and Peter Berger assumed a more assertive
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stance, identifying the professional groups that arose to staff the
welfare state as being the true beneficiaries: "intentionally or not,
this body of laws (making up, in the aggregate, what we now
know as the American welfare state) provided powerful handles
for the intervention by professionals in the lives of individual fam-
ilies" (1983, p. 33). So equipped, human service professionals used
the programs of the welfare state as instruments to disempower
poor, predominantly minority families, in so doing reinforcing
social stratification.
These themes blossomed in The Bell Curve by Charles Murray
and Richard Herrnstein (1994). According to Murray and Her-
rnstein, low intelligence contributed to a range of social patholo-
gies: teen pregnancy, welfare dependence, crime, unemployment,
school failure, and family break-up. The reproduction of the low-
IQ poor assured the growth of a "cognitive underclass", a sub-
population that is unable to benefit from well-intentioned social
programs. Rather than improve the conditions of the underclass,
welfare benefits maintained the degenerate poor, assuring the
replication of those with low-IQ. The growth of the irremediable
underclass eventually increased the hazards for intellectuals in
the society, so the "cognitive elite" sought security by walling
itself off in gated communities. Yet, despite the hazard presented
by the underclass, the cognitive elite has been unable to mount
credible responses to the threat posed by the low-IQ poor. The
result, contended Herrnstein and Murray, has been an inevitable
dumbing-down of American society.
Finally, conservatives contended that excessive regulation
promulgated by liberals extended the role of the federal gov-
ernment to the point that American society was in jeopardy.1
This argument evolved most vividly through the "mediating
structures project" of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI).
In the late 1970s, AEI commissioned Peter Berger and Richard
John Neuhaus to prepare an explanation for the nation's ills. The
product, To Empower People (1977), theorized that the American
malaise could be attributed to a pervasive alienation sensed by
individuals as "megastructures" increasingly dominate social
relations. The disempowering megastructures included big gov-
ernment, the corporate sector, big labor unions, and professional
associations. The solution to this condition, Berger and Neuhaus
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proposed, was the reinforcement of "mediating structures": the
neighborhood, civic associations, the church, and family. Thus,
began the Right's infatuation with small-town Americana. Not
long thereafter, Michael Novak assumed responsibility for the
"mediating structures project" and in Toward a Theology of the Cor-
poration (1981) reclassified big business as a mediating structure,
leaving as megastructures the institutions most closely associated
with liberalism.2 According to Novak, the corporation was an
essential feature of a three-part system of checks and balances.
American culture was a trinity comprised of the economy, the
state and a social culture, represented by the corporation, gov-
ernment, and mediating structures, respectively (Stoesz & Karger,
1992, p. 48). The authoritarian impulses of big government must
be countered by a protean corporate sector and vibrant mediating
structures, Novak contended. In the absence of such correctives,
big government threatens civilization itself.
Having identified big government as a cultural hazard, the
problem of responding to social need remained, however. The so-
lution was proposed by the Heritage Foundation's Marvin Olasky
who suggested the revival of mediating structures extant prior to
the New Deal. "The more effective provision of social services
will ultimately depend on their return to private and especially
to religious institutions," he averred. "Most of our 20th century
schemes have failed. It's time to learn from the warm hearts and
hard heads of the 19 th- (1990, p. 14). By reinvigorating mediating
structures, conservatives argued that the jeopardy posed by the
social programs of big government could be avoided. Not surpris-
ingly, as welfare reform proposals proliferated in various states,
the more conservative governors favored replacing government
welfare with voluntary, nonprofit activities, all consistent with
mediating structures theory and, of course, the jeopardy thesis.
Proactive Rhetoric
If conservatives have invoked a reactionary rhetoric to such
success, is a subsequent, proactive rhetoric conceivable? If so, the
rhetoric should meet two criteria. Proactive rhetoric must address
flaws in the conservative critique of social programs and do so in
a way that avoids the liberal tendency to recite dated theses. The
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task is not only to demonstrate the inadequacy of conservative
public philosophy, but also to present a vocabulary of motive
that resonates with current and projected experience.
As counterpoint to the perversity thesis (programs exacerbate
poverty), a mobility thesis should be presented as a way to enhance
prosperity. Conservative consequences of the perversity thesis-
making receipt of welfare conditional on specific behaviors-is
appealing rhetorically, but in practice it is at best ambiguous.
Most research on welfare-to-work programs shows that they not
only fail to vault many people into economic independence, but
they also fail to save government substantial amounts in welfare
expenditures (Stoesz, 1997). Research by the Manpower Demon-
stration Research Corporation (MDRC) reveals that the typical
welfare-to-work program increases participants' income, but only
by several hundred dollars annually, hardly enough to make
them self-sufficient. Moreover, savings to welfare departments
are modest. Because of the initial investment needed to mount
a welfare-to-work program, it often takes years for agencies to
recover that initial outlay and achieve net savings (Gueron &
Pauly, 1991). Many welfare-to-work enthusiasts regard the River-
side, California program as a model, yet the results there are far
from sanguine: "Even the Riverside program, considered to be
the most successful welfare-to-work program evaluated to date,
does not promise lasting results. Three years after entering the
program, only 23 percent of the participants were still employed
and off AFDC," observed Randall Eberts of the Upjohn Institute
for Employment Research. "Furthermore, the earnings do little
to lift welfare recipients out of poverty. In California overall,
only 20 percent of the participants had annual incomes above
the poverty rate after three years" (1995, p. 4).
If welfare-to-work disappoints, the implications of other
forms of conditionality of welfare are at least as problematic.
Learnfare-the requirement that AFDC children attend school
regularly or their families risk benefit reductions-requires a
"bean-counting" capability that would be a bonanza to the stereo-
typical government bureaucrat. An evaluation of Milwaukee's
experience with Learnfare concluded that the program failed to
produce the outcomes promised by proponents (Quinn & Magill,
1994). But, the imposition of time limits is most troublesome.
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Findings of the Institute for Women's Policy Research reveal that
over 40 percent of AFDC mothers are either peripherally attached
to the labor market, augmenting welfare with wages, or they
drift in and out of welfare depending on the availability of work
(Spalter-Roth, et al., 1995). LaDonna Pavetti (1995) of the Urban
Institute reports that 56 percent of women leave welfare by the
end of the first year, and 70 percent leave by the end of two years;
however, 45 percent return to public assistance before the end of
the first year off welfare, and 57 percent return by the end of two
years. The imposition of time limits would put an abrupt halt
to the parallel and cyclical relationship between low wages and
welfare. Without public assistance many poor mothers would
simply be unable to support their families (Edin & Lein, 1997).
A mobility thesis would focus attention on the aspirations of
the poor and highlight their climb up the socio-economic lad-
der. Perhaps the best evidence of this comes from immigration
research which indicates that immigrants have labor force partic-
ipation rates that eclipse those of native residents (Borjas, 1990).
Not only do they create more jobs than they take, but immigrants
also show a net contribution to the tax base (Simon, 1989; Fix
& Passel, 1994). A conceptual illustration of the mobility thesis
is the Individual Development Account (IDA) proposal fielded
by Michael Sherraden (1991). Noting that most welfare benefits
focus on income maintenance, but that most poor families become
prosperous by accruing assets, Sherraden suggests IDAs to pro-
mote upward mobility of the poor. IDAs are tax-exempt accounts
providing they are spent on completing an education, buying a
home, establishing a business, or supplementing a pension. An
individual's contribution to an account would be matched by an
external source, such as philanthropy or government, according
to the income of the account holder (Edwards & Sherraden, 1994).
The Center for Enterprise Development has undertaken an $15
million demonstration of IDAs at 13 sites across the nation as the
"Downpayment on the American Dream" project. Microcredit,
sometimes called microenterprise, is another example of a mobil-
ity accelerating program.
An answer to the futility thesis (programs are useless) would
be the empowerment of the poor. Interestingly, conservatives have
been able to trump liberals with the futility thesis because of
40 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
the Left's persistent focus on the evils of laissez faire: because
capitalism skews the distribution of resources and opportunities,
the victims should be provided with necessities by government
outside of the market. This has justified the erection of public
monopolies to serve the poor, bureaucracies that segregate the
poor economically and socially from the mainstream. One of the
great ironies of contemporary welfare has been the genius with
which some "bleeding-heart" conservatives have diverged from
the party line and exploited this opening. Noting welfare mother
Kimi Gray's courage in organizing neighbors in a District of
Columbia housing project in order to expel drug users, Secretary
of Housing and Urban Development, Jack Kemp, initiated a pro-
gram through which tenants could buy their housing units. Sec-
retary of Education William Bennett endorsed the school choice
initiative that had been introduced to the Wisconsin legislature
by former welfare recipient "Polly" Williams. In the early 1990s,
Kemp and Williams teamed up to launch a conservative policy
institute, Empower America.
Empowering the poor requires a deconstruction of the welfare
bureaucracy while offering service recipients choice of providers.
The school choice debate has generated the charter school con-
cept, yet a comparable initiative in welfare is yet to be clearly
articulated. How might empowerment be applied to welfare?
Typically, welfare departments consist of two divisions: income
maintenance (dispersing public assistance, Food Stamp, Supple-
mental Security Income benefits) and social services (providing
foster care, adoption, day care, and home help services). Income
maintenance could be capitated and put out to bid to private
(commercial or nonprofit) financial institutions that would func-
tion as Community Development Banks (CDBs). Services offered
by CDBs would include account management (including check-
ing, savings, and the use of smart cards for access of benefits
from Automatic Teller Machines and Food Stamps automatically
deducted at check-out), tax preparation to optimize refunds from
the Earned Income Tax Credit, counseling in use of training and
education benefits, and long-range financial planning. Utilizing
direct deposit, CDBs would have on reserve substantial sums
that could be used for community development projects, such as
microenterprise (Solomon, 1991). Members could enroll in a CDB
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of their choice. Social services could be deconstructed through use
of social service vouchers. Once eligible, consumers could choose
among a roster of approved providers, selecting one using state-
of-art technology, such as interactive television, and providing
evaluations at the end of service that would be used to rate
provider performance (Stoesz, 1992).
The restructuring of industrial bureaucracies rebuts the jeop-
ardy thesis (policy subverts previous achievements). The flatten-
ing of corporate bureaucracies has proceeded with a vengeance
during the past decade. Firms such as IBM, Sears, and General
Motors, have laid off tens of thousands of employees in order to
maximize the use of technology, shed unnecessary workers, while
diverting savings to stockholders through profits and bonuses to
executives via excessive compensation packages (Sloan, 1996).
Within government, restructuring was promoted by David Os-
borne (1988) who investigated how governors were adjusting to
increasing demand for services yet diminishing federal assistance
to the states. Later Osborne teamed up with Ted Gaebler (1992)
to produce Reinventing Government, a book that quickly captured
the attention of public administrators. Osborne then consulted
with Vice-President Al Gore (1993) on the National Performance
Review, a federal house-cleaning initiative that promised to elim-
inate 252,000 federal employees at an alleged savings of $108
billion. Thus, the industrial era edifices of the corporate and gov-
ernmental sectors appear headed to the bureaucratic rendering
plant.
Within this broad context of organizational transformation,
experimentation in welfare provision has proceeded in the form
of state welfare reform demonstrations. As noted above, most
state experimentation in welfare reform is aimed at countering
the perversity thesis, not restructuring welfare per se. For that
very reason, state welfare reforms that reflect a preoccupation
with making receipt of welfare conditional on normative be-
havior require further elaboration of the welfare bureaucracy.
In a delectable irony that liberals might be quick to point out,
such social engineering of the poor contradicts conservative pre-
cepts since it amplifies the functions and costs of government.
Conservatively-inspired welfare reform thus generates a perver-
sity of its own by expanding the public welfare apparatus.
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Logically, devolution of welfare from the federal government
to the states could achieve restructuring, providing governors
were willing to dismantle their public welfare bureaucracies. To
date few have been willing to do so for fear of angering state
employee organizations and client advocacy groups. Such en-
tropy notwithstanding, an exemplary illustration of restructur-
ing is the Savannah-Chatham (Georgia) Youth Futures Authority
(YFA). Since 1987, YFA has collapsed several categorical welfare
programs, used pooled revenues to deploy "family advocates",
generated a common eligibility form, and developed a paperless,
electronic record system. Services are provided in a poor neigh-
borhood and delivered by "family advocates", case managers
who are assigned two per census tract and manage no more than
25 cases each. Electronic record keeping facilitates correlating
case experience with social indicators so that each year YFA
can determine service outcomes. While not all indicators show
consistent improvement, several do, including reduction in the
teen birthrate, the number of children who are behind grade in
school, and the number of founded cases of child abuse (Five
year report, 1994). In dispelling the "big brother" image of federal
social programs, the YFA illustrates how restructuring can refute
the jeopardy thesis.
Proactive Rhetoric
The theses associated with liberalism (adequacy, equality, reg-
ulation), conservatism (perversity, futility, jeopardy), and their
sequel (mobility, empowerment, restructuring) are depicted in
Chart 1. This scheme of rhetorical transitions suggests that liber-
alism defined domestic policy roughly from 1935 to 1980, and that
conservatism served a similar function from 1980 until sometime
early in the next century. Until they abandon their antiquated
rhetoric, liberals will continue to be vulnerable to conservative
barrages directed at the welfare state, such as Newt Gingrich's,
whose antipathy for federal social programs has permeated the
Republican party: "The decay of the welfare state ... has reduced
citizens to clients, subordinated them to bureaucrats and sub-
jected them to rules that are anti-work, anti-opportunity and
anti-property. The welfare state must be replaced, not reformed"
Proactive Rhetoric
Chart 1
Rhetoric and Ideology
Orientation to Liberalism Conservatism Proactive Rhetoric
Program outcomes: Adequacy Perversity Mobility
Policy objectives: Equality Futility Empowerment
Government policy: Regulation Jeopardy Restructuring
(1995). Liberals would be wise to recognize that an increasing
number of Democrats hold reservations about governmental so-
cial programs. Ted Kennedy, speaking before the Women's Na-
tional Democratic Club as early as 1988, had said, "We now
stand between two Americas, the one we have known and the
one toward which we are heading. The New Deal will live in
American history forever as a supreme example of government
responsiveness to the times. But it is no answer to the problems
of today" (Broder, 1988). In the shadow of the 1994 Republican
electoral triumph, "new" Democrat Al From had been more blunt:
"The New Deal Era is over. It was a grand and glorious era for
Democrats, but it is over. The nails are in the coffin of New Deal
liberalism, and it is dead and buried. It was a great ideology
while it lasted-it was the ideology that built the middle class
of America-but the policies that built the middle class can no
longer earn their support. And we have lost them" (Kelly, 1994).
Any fantasies about President Clinton's liberal tendencies disap-
peared with his signing the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, ending a 60-year social
entitlement for poor families.
That liberals will respond effectively to their rout at the
rhetoric of conservatives cannot be predicted with confidence.
Many continue to harbor the illusion that the current reversal in
public sentiment is transitory; given time, Americans will revert
to their modern liberal sensibilities. The "pendulum theory" of
ideological transformation has been proposed with greatest grav-
ity by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. (1986) who noted that conservatism
and liberalism oscillated in 30-year cycles. From the 1935 Social
Security Act to the 1965 Great Society legislation, Schlesinger
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extrapolated that the next expansion in social programs would
occur after the election of an unambiguously liberal president
around 1995. Instead of a resurgence of liberalism, America wit-
nessed the (re)election of Bill Clinton who worked in consort with
a conservative Congress to repeal the federal social entitlement
for poor families.
As conservatives of a generation ago were confronted with
disarray after the failed Goldwater presidential candidacy, so
liberals today must deal with the lack of vigor inspired by their
rhetoric. Certainly, socio-economic circumstance provides ample
material for fashioning a new and compelling lexicon: income
disparities between the rich and poor are at all-time highs; hyper-
segregation intensifies in older cities; the underclass metastasizes;
social programs constrict. In light of deteriorating conditions, the
liberal reflex has not been to entertain a "proactive rhetoric",
however, but instead to indulge in shibboleths of the past. While
this may be psychologically reassuring for those who can afford
to so humor themselves, it offers little succor for the millions of
Americans who have been segregated from the mainstream.
Notes
1. Hirschman suggested that conservatives opposed progressive initiatives out
of a fear that they would subvert earlier achievements-already secured civil
and political rights. I would argue that the issue is more profound; that
conservatives fear that nothing less than civilization is at stake.
2. Cleverly, Novak pulls off this sleight-of-hand in a footnote on page 5.
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